The Illusion of Self

Mark Medweth
Department of Psychology
Simon Fraser University
medweth@sfu.ca

Whether we experience confusion, frustration, or enjoyment, such experiences take place through the mind. Thus, whether our interests are psychological, scientific, or religious in nature, it would seem important for us to understand the workings of the brain. If the ego or "self" (interchangeable words in Buddhist philosophy) plays a role in these experiences as well as abnormal development, as some psychologies would propose, we should more carefully examine what part they play in our psychological well being. An examination of some basic tenets concerning the ego, "self," or "I" from a Buddhist perspective reveals a very different view from traditional Western personality theories.
The Western Self

The importance of the ego or "self" which emanates from Western psychology is explicitly extensive. Ego Psychology, typified by Freud, emphasizes the development of the capabilities of the ego (Muzika, 1990). Cognitive-behavioural therapy deals, in part, with inappropriate self-ideas and fosters changes in attitudes we hold about the "self" (Muzika, 1990). Allport lists a strong ego identity as a descriptor of maturity while Erikson adds ego-integrity to his psychosocial stages of the life cycle (Goleman, 1981). Generally speaking, a wide-spread Western assumption suggests that the ego, "self," or "I" is thought of as a separate system, apart from such aspects as the body, spirit, or even matter in some cases (Welwood, 1976).

While Eastern perspectives of psychology may agree with some Western views of development and treatment (De Silva, 1985), there is a fundamental disagreement as to whether the ego is necessary for normal psychological functioning (Nitis, 1989). In fact, in regarding the conception of "self" as the main source of all suffering, putting an end to the "self" is a key focus of Buddhist psychology. While there are more than 200 varieties of psychotherapy, few of these would suggest that the "self" is an illusion (Muzika, 1990). Most would, in fact, attempt to strengthen such aspects of the person, making them more capable of bearing the pain of one's experience. Since Western traditions would highlight the disappearance of self-other boundaries in major psychoses and borderline cases, it is understandable that the idea of transcending the "self" or ego might be dismissed as regressive psychopathology (Walsh, 1988). However, some of the greatest Buddhist scholars maintain that Western science has yet to learn enough about the brain to appreciate the Eastern understanding of the mind and its implications (Komito, 1983). An examination of general Buddhist views of the "self" leaves the West with much to think about.

The concepts of self and free will are considered in the framework of the organism-environment theory, which starts with the basic postulate that subjective experience is based on a unitary organism-environment system. It is claimed that the appearance of consciousness was bound to the evolving cooperation of the organism-environment systems, and the self appeared in the cooperative system as a set of relations related to the role of the individual in the achievement of common results. The experience of freedom of will is regarded as real, although basically all actions are deterministic and dependent on the whole organization of the universe. Freedom of will reflects the relation of the human being to the future that is not yet known, thus allowing the experience of free alternatives.

KEY WORDS: Consciousness - self - language - brain - organism-environment system - free will - knowledge

I. THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

1
The concept of the self is used nowadays in many disciplines. Each tries to make sense of this concept in its own ways, but such considerations are often misplaced, because "the self" is basically a psychological concept, and should be understood precisely within a psychological theory. However, traditional psychology has not been very successful in this respect.

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The problems in the theoretical account of the self are closely related to the basic conceptual problems of psychology as a science. From its beginnings, psychology has had trouble in defining its basic units of study: what should be regarded as a unit in any psychological theory? Following the general divide in philosophy, psychology has used as a unit internal mental activity in various forms (idealism) or external stimulus-response relations (materialism). Both of these approaches have severe problems in defining the concept of the self. Roughly, the former approach - following the Cartesian paradigm of separation of the soul and body - regards the self as an inner agent, separated from the rest of the world (e.g. psychoanalysis), whereas the latter interprets the self as an epiphenomenon or illusion having no role in psychological theory (e.g. behaviorism and cognitive science).

Whatever happens, where or when, we're prone to wonder who or what's responsible. This leads us to discover explanations that we might not otherwise imagine, and that helps us predict and control not only what happens in the world, but also what happens in our minds. But what if those same tendencies should lead us to imagine things and causes that do not exist? Then we'll invent false gods and superstitions and see their hand in every chance coincidence. Indeed, perhaps that strange word "I"—as used in "I just had a good idea"—reflects the selfsame tendency. If you're compelled to find some cause that causes everything you do —why, then, that something needs a name. You call it "me." I call it "you."
- Marvin Minsky